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EUROPE: A SINGLE CURRENCY AND A
SINGLE CENTRAL BANK?
Hugo J. Hahn*
Permit me first to add some biographical data to my sincere thanks
for the invitation to speak to you about the important questions of a
single and unified European currency and a European central bank
within the framework of the Communities. Indeed, I feel all the more
honored by this invitation because I was Legal Adviser of the German
delegation which, more than thirty years ago, negotiated the treaties
on the Common Market.
In 1958, as Legal Adviser of the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation, I was witness to the trial by fire of the solidifying
process of the young European Economic Community, at the Chiteau
de la Muette in Paris. At that time, the continental members of the
young supranational institution rejected the demand to enter into a
free-trade zone covering all of Europe. This demand had been sup-
ported over the previous months by Great Britain in particular. On
December 18, 1958, at twelve minutes before midnight, the members
informed the head of the British delegation, Anthony Crosland, of
their definitive "no." This event led to the membership of the United
Kingdom in the EEC as well as the reconstitution of the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation ("OEEC") and its continuation
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
current OECD. Finally, over long years, as attorney ad litem of the
Federal Government in the Young Loan Arbitration, which ended on
May 16, 1980, I often referred to the legal structure and to the func-
tioning of the European Monetary System ("EMS"), as well as to the
"Snake" which preceded it, in order to demonstrate, by reference to
the law in force, the procedure for and the consequences of modifying
exchange rates in a system with fixed rates at a time when the Bretton
Woods scheme was already history. In short, though the subject pro-
posed to me points toward the future, it no less constitutes - and not
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just for the speaker - the reflection of professional experiences and
their legal solutions.
Despite the different orientations of the national judicial systems
among the Member States, the European Communities are anchored
in a common legal tradition. This common tradition includes, among
other concepts, the constitutional law principle of the separation of
powers. Born in England and formulated mainly in France, this tradi-
tion today influences the constitutional life of all the democratic Euro-
pean countries. Against this background of common tradition, it is
not surprising that the law of the Community also recognizes a sort of
separation of powers, particularly because the fundamental rights
flowing from the constitutional traditions common to the member
States are part of the general principles which the organs of the com-
munity have to safeguard. In this context, it seems judicious to refer
not to the separation of powers, but to the separation of functions,
since the intergovernmental unions, in general, do not have as many
obligations or as much power as the governments of the Member
States. Instead, the unions work toward the execution of a specific
task that the national administrations seem, for one reason or another,
less able to accomplish.
The independence of central banks from the government as to their
arsenal of instruments for monetary regulation constitutes a model for
the separation of functions in executive power, a model until now real-
ized only at the national level, mainly in Western Europe and in the
United States. One cannot stress too strongly that the true reason the
government, and in large measure the parliament, were excluded from
the legal possibility of intervening in the domain reserved statutorily to
the bank of issue was that the power of the executive and legislative
branches to intervene at the level of these regulatory mechanisms risks
a perpetual temptation to occasionally fail to maintain or re-establish
monetary stability. At a notably delicate electoral period for the polit-
ical parties, it further risks privileging groups which may influence the
outcome of elections. In this context, influential voices currently call
for the autonomy of the European central bank whose creation, even
though not foreseen forthwith, nonetheless already inflames the polit-
ical imagination.
In such a situation, it cannot be the proper role of a jurist to specu-
late on political decisions which alone are apt to engender that crea-
tion. However, the jurist can propose models which illustrate the legal
regulation to which the cooperation between the different organs of a
State or a union of States in the monetary domain may be subject, and
which serve as examples for the establishment of a European central
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bank. Any presentation of instances of monetary cooperation in Eu-
rope must begin with a description of the European Monetary System.
First of all, the treaty which established the EEC initially did not
include any stipulation envisaging the creation of a European mone-
tary zone. The absence of specific monetary targets ensued essentially
from the successful operation of the Bretton Woods accords and their
practically world-wide system of fixed exchanges, a system which in-
cluded the Member States of the Community. These governments
were not inclined to consent to any other restriction or to any addi-
tional transfer of their sovereignty in favor of an organ of the
Community.
The institution of the EMS took place only after the collapse of the
monetary order conceived in 1944, a collapse definitively sealed by the
new version of article IV of the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") Articles of Agreement after the interlude of the European
monetary cooperation known as the "Snake." The objective of the
EMS that came into effect on March 13, 1979, was to establish a closer
monetary cooperation resulting in a zone of stability in Europe. A
system of fixed rates, established in conformity with article IV, para-
graph 2b(ii), of the IMF Articles of Agreement and destined to rely on
the European Currency Unit ("ECU") in addition to national curren-
cies as a pillar, was supposed to serve this objective. The ECU is de-
fined as a "basket," comprising determined amounts of each currency
in the Community. Within the system, it serves the following
functions:
(1) denominator for the exchange rate mechanism;
(2) basis for a divergence indicator;
(3) unit of account for measuring operations in both the intervention
and the credit mechanisms;
(4) means of settlement between monetary authorities in the EEC.
The members of the EMS are the States which belong to the Com-
munity. However, Greece and Portugal do not yet participate in the
exchange rate mechanism. The decisions to be made within the sys-
tem are essentially the responsibility of the central banks. This is par-
ticularly the case with interventions in the currency markets and the
borrowing and lending which is indispensable for carrying out these
operations in the monetary circuit of the EMS. Their settlement is
obtained through the European Monetary Cooperation Fund
("EMCF") which so far has not been able to achieve monetary impor-
tance outside of this technical function. The most important deci-
sions, those that concern changes in the central rates, fall within the
competence of the governments and the Commission, which always
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have allowed the central banks to participate in such decisions.
Outside of the EMS, the ECU is used as a unit of account in private
business operations. The Commission conceives the ECU to be the
basis for the creation of a European currency and thus has tried to
encourage such private use of the ECU.
The governors of the EEC central banks, however, have required
that this neither entail an increase of liquidity in the Community nor
undermine the efficiency of their money market instruments. While
acknowledging that the Bank for International Settlement ("BIS")
may act as agent of the ECU Banking Association ("EBA") in the
operation of the private ECU compensatory clearing system in addi-
tion to its function as agent for the EMCF, the governors very clearly
enunciated their refusal, for that very reason, to endorse any unifica-
tion of official ECU and private ECU circuits or any other mixture of
the two.
In article 105 Sec. 2, the EEC treaty provides for the creation of an
advisory monetary committee to coordinate monetary policy among
EEC members and to ensure proper functioning of the Common Mar-
ket. The body watches the monetary and financial situation of these
states and of the Community, as well as their financial transactions
generally, and informs the EEC Council and EEC Commission regu-
larly about them. Furthermore, at the request of these two EEC or-
gans, it renders them its assessment, as it is subject to their authority,
but also proceeds likewise on its own initiative.
Article 5 of the committee's Rules requires its members to "possess
outstanding knowledge in the monetary field. As a general rule, each
member state shall select one member from among senior officials of
the administration and the other member on the proposal of the Cen-
tral Bank." Once "appointed . . . in their personal capacity," the
members of the committee do not sit as representatives of their respec-
tive governments, "but shall, in the general interest... of the Commu-
nity, be completely independent in the performance of their duties."
They can be relieved of their functions only if they cease to meet the
required criteria, though these criteria are indeed defined rather
sweepingly in the "Rules." The short duration of their mandate -
only two years - attenuates the independence of the committee's
members. The term of duty, however, can be renewed.
Like the monetary committee, the "Committee of Governors of
the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic
Community" ("Governors' Committee"), owes its existence to article
105 of the EEC treaty which requires EEC members to coordinate
their economic policy and to establish cooperation between their cen-
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tral banks. To this end, a Council Decision of May 8, 1964, set up the
Governors' Committee. The Governors' Committee is comprised of
the governors of the national institutes of issue and, as a rule, a mem-
ber of the commission as the latter's representative. The decision does
not contain any other clauses which set forth or imply a link between
the committee and other organs of the Community, except that the
commission may require its convocation. One could thus deduce, by
interpreting the express clauses concerning the EMCF Board of Gov-
ernors that, e contrario, the Governors' Committee is not subject to
the instructions of any Community organ.
To a considerable extent, the increase in the density of cooperation
between the member States of the Community has been due to EEC
institutions. This is not surprising as regards the EMCF and EMS
since the Fund has been the most recent implementation of the objec-
tive enunciated by the Werner Plan. The Werner Plan calls for the
establishment, within 10 years, of a monetary and economic union
with a unique central bank, while EMS initially was to function in its
present form for a transitional period of two years only. In the
meantime, the evolution of monetary policy in the Community indeed
tends to favor the setting up of a European central bank, the basic
traits of which have remained in the forefront of any pertinent discus-
sion since mid-1988. The attempt to enact EEC-wide fixed exchange
rates as well as the attempt to maintain national sovereignty over the
currency and national monetary jurisdiction (though with the restric-
tions imposed on EEC members by "central rates" ensuing from the
law of the Community), are no longer felt to be compatible with the
target of the European Monetary Union. Rather the transfer of the
power to enact monetary policy to the Community, more precisely to
an establishment that remains to be created within the Community,
seems to be needed in the future.
Even before the committee was formed, U.S. central banking in the
guise of the Federal Reserve System had often been referred to as a
model for the unique European institute of issue. Since that time, this
opinion has also been put forth by a member of the group chaired by
Monsieur Delors. The advantages of this system entice on two levels.
First, it suggests a federal central banking structure similar to the
American system which, at the outset, provided the individual Reserve
Banks in the United States with significant means of money market
intervention and encouraged the generous use of regional autonomy in
actual practice. Since then, the Federal Reserve system has moved
rather toward centralization, evidenced by the current inclination of
the various Reserve Banks to pursue a unitary rather than autono-
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mous monetary policy without excluding the formative and control-
ling influence of their respective presiding officers on the elaboration of
monetary targets and their implementation within the United States as
a whole. The Federal Reserve System, moreover, gives pride of place
to its other decisive trait, its unfettered functional independence from
the federal executive, an independence amply rounded off by the long
tenures of the Federal Reserve Board's members and of their col-
leagues which head the constituent local units.
The system of the Bank deutscher Lander ("BdL"), instituted in
West Germany after the Second World War to exercise the functions
of an institute of issue before being transformed into the Deutsche
Bundesbank in 1957, is certainly less well-known abroad than the Fed-
eral Reserve System, with which it nevertheless has a number of points
in common. This similarity explains why mainly German authors
take this model as a blueprint for a European central bank.
The occupation of Germany by the Allied Forces and its division
into four zones of occupation entailed the complete cessation of the
activities exercised by the Reichsbank as the institute of issue. Initi-
ated in 1946 by the military government within the U.S. zone of occu-
pation, the Landeszentralbanken became the central banks of the
newly constituted Lander, the territorial and political subdivisions of
the nascent Federal Republic. The Landeszentralbanken assumed,
due to the fiat of the occupation authorities, all the powers tradition-
ally given to institutes of issue or, in comparison to the U.S. Federal
Reserve System, the individual Reserve Banks, but were denied the
power to issue banknotes and coins. The banking operations were
managed by a Directorate whose chairman was appointed by the
Prime Minister of the Land concerned, while the other members were
named by the council of administration. That council was comprised
of representatives of business organizations and trade unions as well as
spokesmen from the major political parties and was charged, in partic-
ular, with determining the bank rate and the various interest rates and
the percentage of minimum reserves to be held by commercial banks
under instructions from the BdL.
It was only in 1948 that the BdL was set up as a common under-
taking by the Lander central banks under the unanimous authoriza-
tion of the three western occupying powers. The Central Bank
council, principal organ of the BdL, declared that the BdL would
carry out the overall monetary policy, in particular, the bank rate and
the interest rates derived from the bank rate. Executive power was
generally reserved to the Lander central banks, which alone could op-
erate business transactions with the commercial banks. The BdL,
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however, only had capacity to act as bank of last resort vis-A-vis
Ldnder central banks, foreign central banks, and governmental au-
thorities. The BdL thus combined traits of a federal structure with the
power to make nationwide regulatory enactments, a combination sus-
ceptible, indeed, of serving as a suitable model for a European central
bank. Unlike the Federal Reserve Board which only defines the policy
of the system and leaves the execution of it to the Federal Reserve
banks (its regional components), the bank could freely pursue its own
policy. That freedom strengthened its position with regard to the
Lander central banks, which had to secure from it, through banking
channels, the coins and banknotes put out exclusively by the BdL.
The Ldnder central banks had to maintain the obligatory minimum
reserves at the BdL.
The European Investment Bank ("EIB"), the only banking entity
provided for in the law of the Community, seems to have attracted less
attention than the BdL in the present context. This is all the more
striking because the EIB ensues from a persuasive effort not only to
keep the interests of the Member States compatible with those of the
Community, but also to honor the needs of a bank which operates in
the financial markets with a certain autonomy. The unique position
conferred by these traits was recently summarized by the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities which found that the bank is en-
dowed, by virtue of article 129 of the EEC treaty, with legal capacity
distinct from that of the Community and is administered and managed
by its own organs according to the provisions of its statute. To per-
form the tasks entrusted to it by article 130 of the EEC treaty, the
bank must be in a position to act in total independence within the
financial markets. Acknowledging such a functional and institutional
autonomy of the bank does not detach it entirely from the Communi-
ties. The basic traits of the bank's ambivalent position is, on the one
hand, its functional independence in the management of its business
and, on the other, a close link to the Community with regard to its
objective.
Functional autonomy within the domain of its competence is in
essence the assessment by the Court of the legal situation experienced
by the EIB in the structure of the Community. This formula was pre-
viously enunciated to describe the independence of the Bundesbank
vis-A-vis the Federal executive. One must wonder how such freedom
of action will be obtained in the case of the EIB. The answer lies in
the structure itself of the EIB organs.
The board of governors, the supreme body of the bank, is com-
posed of ministers named by the Member States. As such, the Member
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States have recourse to the same persons that are on the council of the
Communities, although no express provision to that effect exists. The
texts do not anticipate the presence of the EEC Commission on the
Board, although the Board, as a rule, invites members of the Commis-
sion to its meetings. The directives of the board of governors insist
upon "the interest of the Community," which the bank must respect
under article 130 of the EEC treaty, a duty which does not arise only
from that provision. This calls for comparison with the clause in the
Bundesbank statute which on the one hand makes the bank independ-
ent from instructions of the Federal executive in monetary matters,
but on the other hand commits it to support the national government's
general economic policy.
The EIB board of directors holds exclusive power of decision over
the granting of loans and guarantees and the issuing of loans. The
board is also responsible for determining interest rates and securing
proper management consistent with the directives of the board of gov-
ernors. The board of directors is composed of a large number of mem-
bers, since the arrival of Spain and Portugal, 22 ordinary members and
12 deputies. It serves as a group of experts with minimum political
influence and reflects the quasi-federal structure of the Community.
Finally, it is fitting to refer to the EIB Management Committee
named by the board of governors at the suggestion of the board of
directors. During their six years of tenure, its members may be dis-
missed. Such a decision requires a majority vote by the board of gov-
ernors and presupposes a recommendation from the board of
directors, also by majority vote. However, there has never been a re-
course to the pertinent provision. It is the responsibility of the Man-
agement Committee to prepare the decisions of the board of directors.
The chairman of the board of directors is not only the "primus inter
pares" (i.e., first among equals in that body) but also presides over the
Management Committee. The president thus serves as a link between
the two organs of the bank. A comparative study of the EIB has to
extend to the Court of Justice its assessment of the bank's place in the
law of the Community - again, functional autonomy on the one
hand, submission to the objectives of the Community on the other.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over the acts
of the bank and its organs is set forth in article 180 of the EEC treaty
which confers on the board of directors the faculty to invoke judicial
action in order to compel Member States to respect their obligations.
Article 180(c) subjects decisions by the board of directors to the con-
trol of the court at the request of a member State or the EEC commis-
sion on the ground that the granting of credit has involved vices of
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form. The latter jurisdictional clause serves as a reminder that even as
an instance of control, the supra-national judiciary has to honor the
limitations inherent in its calling.
It is too soon to predict if, and when, a European central bank may
start to operate and what influence the institutions presented here as
models could have on its structure. Yet as a matter of community
law, the trail leading to such an institution has already been blazed.
Article 102a, inserted into the EEC treaty as a result of the Single
European Act, endorses the result of the debate on reform by encour-
aging Member States to make an effort toward greater convergence of
their economic and monetary policies. The experiences acquired in
the operation of the EMS and the development of the ECU must be
taken into account, but do not offer the only possible models of mone-
tary integration in Europe. If the development of the ECU goes
ahead, a formal procedure of amending the EEC treaty may be indis-
pensable because its article 236 would seem to require application in
the case of institutional modifications as spelled out by article 102a of
the EEC treaty, though one may regret the ponderous procedure thus
to be initiated. But as the setting up of a European central bank would
entail substantial cuts in the sovereignty of Member States, simple
governmental decisions would be a dubious vehicle for bringing about
these relinquishments, for example, under article 235 of the treaty
without the participation of the parliaments.
If I would terminate here with no explanation, one could reproach
me for not having dealt with half of the question - the legal aspects of
a single and unitary European central bank and the legal conditions of
a single and unitary European currency. I have left the second part of
the title without comment until now. The reasons, however, that I did
so are the same as those that cause me to refrain from formulating
political advice or legal policy on the normative status of a common
central bank. In the latter case, my reservation was motivated by the
double task of the jurist, which is, on the one hand, to apply existing
law, and, on the other hand, to translate political decisions into rules
of conduct and assessment, rather than to contradict norms of higher
rank and therefore fail to respect their goal. The two conditions are
entirely lacking in the discussion among the political authorities in the
Community regarding the legal status of a European central bank.
There are no rules of law that can be applied in this domain, nor polit-
ical decisions capable of being translated into legal rules. This is the
reason why I mentioned, in the autobiographical prologue, projects
which I have lived through personally. Then and there, it was a mat-
ter of applying positive law on the one hand, while on the other, clear
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political decisions permitted the jurist to practice his profession. The
references to historical and political instances borrowed from the con-
temporary law of intergovernmental financial institutions make it ap-
parent that structurally the assignment of pertinent domains from
Member States to the Community might be envisaged. Yet, as the
examples prove, political decisions to that effect are not the business of
the jurist.
A first part of the answer to the question of the creation of a single,
unique European currency repeats the position set forth already with
regard to the European central bank due to the silence of political
leaders. At the same time this part of the answer would not be com-
plete unless rounded off by a reference to the history of monetary law
and to the practice of emerging unions of States. Indeed, there has
never been a federal State (that is, a union of States functioning under
a national constitution), nor a confederation of States (that is, an asso-
ciation of States subject to public international law) that equipped it-
self with a new common currency forthwith when it had just become a
single monetary area. This historical fact is proven by the monetary
history of the United States as well as the union of the German states
and cities after the Napoleonic wars and the regrouping of the Ger-
man territories by Bismarck. In all the cases whose history it is possi-
ble to trace, the currency of each Member State was maintained first,
even after the setting up of a single institute of issue. It was only later
that there appeared, more or less rapidly, a common currency having
the same value throughout the territory of the association.
The first lesson to draw from this historical overview is that it is
appropriate to moderate impatient appeals which call for juridical for-
mulae for a single currency because these appeals put the cart before
the horse. Certainly there are supplementary reasons ensuing from
the present situation that plead in favor of a moderate pace, reasons
that are found in each of the cases mentioned here. The creation of a
new monetary unit and agreement about its name and value inside the
Community and abroad should be placed in the hands of the authority
that would have to put the new unit into circulation and manage its
introduction and use. The more experience this authority has been
able to gain in surveying cooperation among Member States and their
civil servants, the better it will accomplish its task. The same holds
true in approximately equal measure for the parliaments concerned in
the Community and its Member States, as well as for the politically
important member governments' administrative institutions. The ju-
diciary in the Communities and the Member States may not need such
advance experience. Obviously, however, the courts can benefit from a
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sort of trial period during which they have an opportunity to assess
the conduct of the new common monetary authority.
In short, if a monetary union is to evolve within a common mone-
tary area, a unique currency for the Communities remains indispensa-
ble. Such a currency, however, should not follow immediately upon,
nor precede, the setting up of the single European authority, but ought
to be the outcome of a probationary test in the practice of the new
institutions.
The dialogue over monetary union received a new impetus in 1989
due to statements made by members of the French government, espe-
cially the minister of finance who repeatedly asserted that the time had
come to investigate the possibility of creating a European central bank
that would administer a common currency, the ECU. The German
Vice-Chancellor took up these proposals in a Memorandum on the
creation of a European currency zone and a European central bank.
The statement not only declared that a European currency zone with a
European central bank was an economically necessary complement to
the European domestic market, but also proposed that the European
Council should appoint a "Council of Wise Men." For this purpose,
the heads of state set up a committee to study the concrete stages in
the realization of an economic and monetary union and to submit use-
ful proposals to the Council. The committee was chaired by the presi-
dent of the EEC Commission, Delors. Its members included the heads
of the members' central banks, along with one member appointed by
the Commission and three by the European Council. The Committee,
soon known as the "Delors Committee," produced a Report on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union in the European Community. The report
envisages the realization of this goal in three stages, within the frame-
work of a unified process so that the decision initiating the first phase
also represents a decision for the project in its entirety. The first phase
began on July 1, 1990, the date on which the total liberalization of
capital movements was accomplished. No firm deadlines were given
for the remaining stages. In the view of the Delors group, the purpose
of the first phase is to work out pertinent changes in the EEC treaty.
This would then set the stage for the next two stages in which respon-
sibility for monetary policy will be transferred from the Member
States to a European System of Central Banks ("ESCB").
The important contribution of the first phase to the overall plan
should lead to stronger rapprochement in economic development
through improved cooperation in economic and monetary policy. In
principle, the existing institutional framework offers the possibility of
attaining the result. Indeed, changes in the EEC Convergence Deci-
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sion of 1974 could introduce multilateral supervision of economic de-
velopment and monetary policy based on agreed criteria, as well as a
new procedure for coordination of monetary market policy. In both
cases, the recommendations of the European Central Bank Governors
Committee are to be taken into consideration. The responsibilities of
this body must be reevaluated with a view to the possibility of assess-
ing national decisions on monetary policy, such as the specification of
annual money-supply goals. This could be done, in particular, by
means of a majority decision, although it would not be binding in law
yet. In this first phase, it would be important to include the currencies
of any and all EEC members in the EMS exchange-rate mechanism.
National legislation in each stage should grant an equal degree of au-
tonomy to its central bank on the lines of the independence enjoyed by
the Federal Reserve Board vis-A-vis the U.S. Federal Government.
The effectuation of the amendments to the EEC treaty entails the
opening of the second phase which includes the setting up of the
ESCB. It would evolve from the coordination of national monetary
policy by the Committee of European Central Bank Governors to the
development and implementation of a common monetary policy envis-
aged for the final phase, for which the ESCB itself would be responsi-
ble. The second stage may thus be regarded as a learning process
leading to collective decisions, while the ultimate responsibility for
policy tenets remains with the national authorities.
The third stage would begin with the operation of the economic
and monetary union and bring about the irrevocable locking of the
exchange rates among the currencies of EEC members; exhaustive,
complete and unmodifiable convertibility of the currencies; unre-
strained freedom of capital movements; and full integration of finan-
cial markets. At the same time, the institutions of the Community
would be endowed with the necessary decision-making powers. For
example, these institutions then could enact binding guidelines for the
national budgets. Such guidelines have two important functions.
First, they prevent the endangering of monetary stability caused by
budget deficits. Second, they bring about a unique financial and fiscal
policy which allows the Community to attain its domestic and foreign
economic goals. The ESCB would assume full responsibility for mon-
etary policy. A common currency evolving from the ECU would re-
place national currencies.
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the Delors Report
generally does not regard the creation of new institutions in the realm
of economic policy as urgent at the present time. A common mone-
tary policy, however, would require a new institution, since concerted
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action is unlikely to result from independent decisions and market in-
terventions by individual central banks.
The Delors Report views the ESCB as compatible with the federal
model, consisting of a central institution and the national central
banks. As instrumentalities of the system, the report introduces (1)
the ESCB Council comprising the Governors of the EEC national cen-
tral banks and the members of the ESCB Directorate, and (2) the Di-
rectorate itself, the members of which are appointed by the European
Council. According to the Delors Report, the ESCB Council has the
power to determine the Community's monetary policy, including the
exchange-rate policy toward third currencies. The Directorate keeps
track of monetary developments and supervises the implementation of
common monetary policies. The national institutes of issue must
carry out these policies in accordance with regulations enacted by the
ESCB Council and its instructions thereunder. The ESCB first and
foremost would be committed to price, i.e. monetary stability. Only
insofar as reconcilable with this primary objective, the ESCB might
support the economic policies decided by the political agencies of the
Community. The Delors Report enumerates the following responsi-
bilities of the ESCB:
(1) Concept and implementation of monetary policy;
(2) Surveillance of exchange rates;
(3) Administration of currency reserves;
(4) An efficient system of payments;
(5) ESCB's shared role in the supervision of banks and other purveyors
of credit.
The Delors Report refrains from spelling out the instruments of
monetary policy available to the ESCB. Nevertheless, it does set forth
that, with the means at its disposal, the ESCB should be able to carry
out central banking functions on the securities and money markets, as
well as exercise regulatory powers. Open-market transactions with na-
tional instruments of indebtedness would still be authorized, unless
they entailed extension of credit to corporations under the control of
national governments or their internal subdivisions. The Delors Re-
port conceives the ESCB as an entirely independent body under the
law of the Community. Its council would not be subject to directives
from the national governments or EEC agencies. An appropriately
long term of office would guarantee the members of the ESCB per-
sonal autonomy. The ESCB should have to report annually to the
European Parliament as well as to the European Council. Adminis-
tratively, the Delors Report places the ESCB under the surveillance of
a college of independent auditors which could control the accounts of
the entity.
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The Delors Report does not give any concrete date for the begin-
ning of the second and third stages of an economic and monetary
union. The resolution of the European Parliament of April 14, 1989,
on the development of the European currency integration, however,
aims at the realization of European monetary union by January 1,
1995. This parliamentary text also merits attention because it includes
a comprehensive draft project proposing a charter for the European
central bank. The transitional phase, however, remains as unspecified
here as in the Delors Report. The European Parliament suggests that
this phase should begin on January 1, 1993, a time frame considerably
later than the first phase as envisaged by the Delors Committee.
It is true that by now all Member States have joined the EMS.
Their participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of this system var-
ies, however. The resolution of the Parliament deals with the issue in
two ways. First, in agreement with the Delors Report, it calls for par-
ticipation of all Member States in the exchange-rate mechanism under
the same conditions, as well as the step-by-step elimination of the mar-
gins of fluctuation by January 1, 1995. Second, the Parliament recog-
nizes that such advances will require a sufficient degree of economic
and social convergence. It therefore refers to the concept of graduated
integration, though emphasizing at the same time the joint responsibil-
ity of all Member States for the advent of economic and monetary
union. In the view of the Parliament, participants in the exchange-
rate mechanism should institutionalize their cooperation in economic
and monetary policy by January 1, 1993, by means of a European Cen-
tral Bank Governors Council and a European Economic and Financial
Council. Together with the Commission and Parliament, these insti-
tutions will blaze the trail for monetary union. The Governors Coun-
cil would concentrate primarily on the coordination of money-supply
and interest policies, while the Economic and Financial Council would
determine the key dates for money markets and financial policies. The
European monetary union will be in existence by January 1, 1995,
although perhaps only for those Member States that are willing and
capable - essentially, the participants in the EMS exchange rate
mechanism. The European central bank represents the heart of the
monetary union - the Community-wide institution of a European
central banking system - in which the institutes of issue of all mem-
bers of the monetary union participate. The responsibilities, organiza-
tion and power of the bank can be found in the European Parliament's
draft status of the statute of the European central bank. It so closely
follows sections of the German Federal statute establishing the
Bundesbank (Bundesbankgesetz - BBankG) that it will suffice to
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trace the rather minor differences here. The federal structure of the
projected reserve system is expressly emphasized in article 2 of the
draft statute. The concept of a federal structure is borne out by the
retention of the power to enforce monetary policy on the basis of reso-
lutions of the European central bank council comprising representa-
tives of the existing national institutes of issue. The European
Parliament at the outset specifies the responsibilities of the European
central bank in language practically identical with Section 3 of the
BBankG. Under the same provision, it receives jurisdiction over bank-
ing surveillance. The central bank has to secure cooperation with the
appropriate international organizations in the monetary field with a
view to the maintenance of border-crossing currency stability. While
the parliamentary project defines the relationship between the bank
and the institutions of the Community in language identical with the
pertinent provisions of the BBankG and therefore safeguards the inde-
pendence of the European institute of issue, it also calls for
mandatory reporting to the European Parliament. The organs of the
bank are the European central bank council and the Directorate. Par-
ticipation by members of the European Parliament in the appointment
of the Directorate differs from the statutory German model, the
BBankG. The draft text assigns to the European central bank the
powers to determine pertinent interest rates and to enact minimum
reserve percentages. Notes issued by the bank and denominated in
European Currency Units ("ECU") are to be the only unrestricted
legal tender in the Community. Yet, along the lines of existing Ger-
man law, the authority to mint coins remains with national govern-
ments, subject of course to Community regulations securing common
standards of weight and composition.
In comparison with the two proposals described here, another per-
tinent project has attracted less attention. It was drafted and released
to the media on May 16, 1989, by a team from the Centre de Promo-
tion et de Recherche pour la Monnaie Europeene ("CEPREM") in
Lyons, under the direction of the Principal Legal Adviser to the Na-
tional Bank of Belgium, Professor Jean-Victor Louis. The European
Council assigned the task of exploring the stages leading to economic
and monetary union to the Delors Committee. The membership of the
CEPREM group, however, comprises primarily central-bank lawyers
and teachers of law. CEPREM desired to develop a text setting forth
elementary treaty provisions required for the establishment of a Euro-
pean Central Bank in the final phase of the evolution towards mone-
tary union. The CEPREM proposal differs from the resolution of the
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parliament in that it is merely a basis for future negotiations rather
than an anticipation of political decisions.
The CEPREM team presented a draft which amends the EEC
treaty and inserts the principal features of the European reserve sys-
tem into the constitution of the Community as well as a proposal for a
bank statute. The European Parliament, on the initiative of the EEC
Commission, would have to approve this statute by an absolute major-
ity and the EEC Council by a qualified majority. The proposed
amendment to the EEC Treaty commits the Community to the enact-
ment, step by step and within a specified time limit, of the texts re-
quired for the completion of monetary union. The monetary union
will have a unique monetary unit denominated the "ECU", pursue a
common domestic and foreign monetary policy and comprise a single
European central bank system including a European central bank.
That central bank would have legal capacity as a corporate entity
under the law of the Community. Its main responsibility would be the
enactment and implementation of a common monetary policy guaran-
teeing stability of the ECU. Under the CEPREM project, the bank
would enjoy independence from the European executive branch and
operate autonomously, similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve System. In
particular, the plan prevents the bank from seeking or accepting direc-
tives from the institutions of the community or from the governments
of the Member States. National institutes of issue would continue to
exist. To guarantee the uniformity of monetary policy, these national
central banks are, in principle, subordinate to the central institution.
Enactments of the national banks would be subject to prior approval
by the European central bank. Moreover, the European central bank
would have the power to delegate specific tasks to one or more na-
tional central banks.
CEPREM, in accordance with the practice in other federal central
bank systems, envisages a bank council comprising the governors of
the national central banks and the Directorate of the European central
bank which determines the general guidelines of and decisions regard-
ing monetary policy. The council also includes a representative of the
EEC Commission who may issue a veto entailing, on the lines of the
Federal German Bundesbank statute, the temporary suspension of the
decision concerned. The Directorate has responsibility for the admin-
istration of the bank, while the governor is in charge of its current
operation. The significant feature of the appointment procedure for
members of the Directorate resides in the involvement of the Euro-
pean Parliament. The latter's identical proposal thus receives endorse-
ment by CEPREM.
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Equally, the proposal defines the powers of the bank in the field of
monetary policy through the terms used by the European Parliament.
CEPREM grants the European central bank the faculty to carry out
any and all transactions required for accomplishing its tasks, unless
expressly prohibited. Likewise, this language appears not only in the
CEPREM amendments to the EEC treaty, but also in the statute of
the bank proposed by the same authors. The functions of the Euro-
pean central bank comprise the traditional money market instruments
of national monetary authorities, including the disposal of reserve po-
sitions in the IMF. The only operation expressly prohibited is the fi-
nancing of public budget deficits. The European central bank may
enact general decisions in order to carry out its responsibilities in the
field of monetary policy, require credit institutions to maintain certain
minimum reserves, and influence the credit transactions of credit insti-
tutions by determining interest rates for deposits and loans from the
national institutes of issue.
A synopsis of the three texts reveals their broad agreement on the
salient features of a European central bank. The differences ensue
from the purpose of each text. There is agreement on the duty of the
institution to maintain the value of money and on the independence of
the European central bank from directives and instructions of the
EEC Council and EEC Commission when implementing monetary
policy. Regarding the organization of a European central bank, all
three texts favor federal models in which the national institutes of is-
sue participate in the execution of the uniform monetary policy and in
law-making and rule-making through the community-wide system
since their governors represent them on the central bank council. Dif-
ferences relate primarily to the specifics of the plans. They probably
ensue occasionally from the absence of a more thorough analysis so
far. As to independence, for example, the Delors Report proposes for
the European central bank the status of an autonomous agency of the
Community not subject to directives from the national governments or
the organs of the Community. Under the influence of the BBankG,
the draft by the European Parliament acknowledges the same princi-
ple, yet does not mention the freedom of representatives of national
central banks serving on organs of the European central bank from the
directives and instructions of their proper national governments. At
the same time, however, CEPREM refers to the future central bank as
an "itablissement public," whereas the parliamentary plan speaks of a
corporate entity with legal capacity under EEC law and thus may be
aiming at an institution substantially separate from the EEC. On the
other hand, to perceive the power of the European central bank as
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"etablissement public" could point to a power of surveillance over the
bank. Under French law, such an establishment of a public law nature
assumes certain functions at its inception ex officio for largely in-
dependent execution. Yet an establishment of that nature remains
subject to state supervision. The legal capacity of a corporation easily
permits interference by potential supervisory authorities. Similar diffi-
culties arise under Community law in the definition of the European
Investment Bank and its relationship to the organs of the Community
culminating in the grant to that bank of legal personality, i.e.,
capacity.
The prominent position the Delors Report gives to the European
Council has no counterpart in the two other proposals. To begin, the
EEC Council appoints the members of the European central bank Di-
rectorate. Second, the bank is accountable to the Council as well as to
parliament. If duly summoned, the president of the ESCB has to re-
port to the European Council. It thus takes on a new character as an
organ of the Community. In addition to statements on political prin-
ciples, it now equally makes legally obligatory decisions on individual
items.
Unlike the organization of the European central bank, the sub-
stance of its jurisdiction over monetary policy and the means for its
implementation receive only scant attention in the CEPREM draft
treaty. To assert that the bank has the power to carry out all transac-
tions not prohibited amounts to a no-load formula. The faculty to
make decisions of a general or individual portent in execution of func-
tions presupposes an enumeration of the transactions and market ini-
tiatives the bank is to survey and control. True, pertinent provisions
are set forth in the CEPREM draft statute. One may wonder, how-
ever, whether the elementary prohibition of budget deficit financing,
which the parliament's project does not even mention, ought not to
find a place in the text of the treaty itself. Moreover, the power of the
European central bank to require minimum reserves merits a more
specific assignment than is present in the language of the parliamen-
tary draft or the CEPREM statute. True, only credit institutions are
meant to maintain minimum reserves. However, the European central
bank's power over the shaping of banking conditions (in particular,
interest rates on loans and deposits) would seem to require more inci-
sive restraints than the mere general announcement that such power
could be exercised for a limited period only. At this point, the ques-
tion arises whether such broad, unspecified grants of executive author-
ity to the European central bank can satisfy the precept that civil
rights may be narrowed only by means of a normative enactment
[Vol. 12:121
Single Currency and Single Central Bank
based on conclusive reasoning, even if the European Court of Justice is
sometimes less prepared to grant constitutional protection to corpora-
tions than to private persons.
The Single European Act of 1986, in force since 1987, inserted into
the EEC treaty article 102a which recommends that consideration be
given to the experience gathered during the operation of the EMS and
in the use of the ECU. It also asks that the present legislative and
executive jurisdiction be respected. It requires, furthermore, the appli-
cation of article 236 of the EEC treaty, which grants each EEC Mem-
ber State the faculty to prevent an amendment from being passed
against its disposition through the provision that a treaty revision re-
quires ratification by all the signatories.
The unequivocal provision of article 102a of the EEC treaty could
bar the result sought by the European Parliament - the establishment
of a European Central Bank Governors Council and a European Eco-
nomic and Financial Council by means of a separate agreement be-
tween those Member States that participate in the EMS exchange-rate
mechanism. The attraction of such a distinct scheme would be pre-
cisely the avoidance of the complicated process required by article
236. In practice, article 102a of the EEC treaty does not seem to deny
the prospects of separate yet more intense monetary cooperation
among some EEC members. Thus, for example, one of the functions
of the Franco-German economic and financial council set up by a bi-
lateral convention in 1988 (concluded without endorsement by the
Community) consists inter alia in the assessment of the monetary pol-
icy pursued by either state, jointly and separately in the European
realm with the goal of reaching as broad an agreement as possible.
That seems to suit the purpose of article 102a of the EEC treaty. For
the first phase of the process establishing European economic and
monetary union, the Delors Report proposes strengthened coordina-
tion of pertinent national policies. This goal should be served by the
amendment to the resolution on cooperation between EEC members'
national central banks approved by the Madrid European Council ses-
sion in June 1989. True, article 102a of the EEC treaty is probably not
restricted to institutional changes, but also applies to the assignment of
new responsibilities to existing agencies when the scope and substan-
tive weight of those changes lead to an incisive loss of sovereignty on
the part of the Member States. Otherwise, it might be possible to en-
dow the existing organs of the Community (Council, Commission,
Monetary Committee and Committee of Central Bank Governors)
with the powers required for economic and monetary union. The pro-
jected evolution seems unlikely to go beyond this goal.
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The conclusion of this introductory survey would therefore
amount to the acknowledgement of a dual affirmation ensuing from
article 102a of the EEC treaty. It remains doubtful on legal grounds
whether the establishment of a unique European central banking
scheme by assigning additional, yet in no way novel, powers to ex-
isting national and supranational bodies requires recourse to that pro-
vision which would make the process subject to unanimous approval
by any and all EEC Members. Yet, in all likelihood, ratification of the
treaty amending the basic EEC compact will be sought in order to
avoid subsequent political controversy or even litigation. The prudent
approach will thus again retain pride of place. In conjunction with the
waiver by the majority of EEC members and their central banks of any
definitive timetable for the advent of the second and third phases en-
visaged by the Delors Report (as expressed at their most recent Rome
meeting in September 1990), the calendar of progress toward Euro-
pean Monetary Union excels anew by the discretionary margin which
has been its significant trait before.
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